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1 Introduction
A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual conditional with an impossible
antecedent. According to some theorists, who we will call vacuists, all coun-
terpossibles are true. According to others, who we will call nonvacuists, some
counterpossibles are true, and some are false.1 In recent work, Williamson [48,
50] has taken up the cause of vacuism. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate
Williamson’s arguments.
We will proceed as follows. In Section 2, we recall some motivations for both
vacuism and nonvacuism, and sketch a sample nonvacuist semantics for counterfac-
tuals using impossible worlds, to serve as a target for Williamson’s arguments. In
Section 3, we present and rebut three arguments Williamson has given against non-
vacuist semantics like the one we give. In Section 4, we present and rebut three
attempts Williamson has made to undermine the intuitions that provide the most
direct support for nonvacuism. In Section 5 we end by arguing that Williamson’s
modal epistemology is not only compatible with nonvacuism, but actually leads in its
direction.
2 Vacuism and Non-vacuism
2.1 The Consensus
We begin by considering the orthodox treatment of counterfactuals, inherited from
Kratzer [21], Lewis [24] and Stalnaker [42].2 To evaluate a counterfactual conditional
like
• If it hadn’t snowed last night, then John’s train wouldn’t have been late
we consider the closest3 possible worlds in which it didn’t snow last night, and see
whether those are worlds in which John’s train isn’t late. A counterfactual is
true just in case all the closest A-worlds are B-worlds. Closeness is understood here
as (largely contextually determined) similarity in the relevant respects, usually as
minimal variation from the world of evaluation required to get the antecedent to come
out true.4 The framework delivers the invalidity of certain (allegedly) intuitively
invalid inferences involving counterfactuals, such as transitivity, contraposition, and
antecedent strengthening.
1This leaves out an option: that they are all false. We will not consider this possibility here, but see Kment
[18] for discussion.
2Precursors can be found in Sprigge [41] and Todd [44]. The debate between vacuists and nonvacuists has
been with us from the beginnings of this orthodoxy; see for example Goddard and Routley [14, p. 454]’s
nonvacuist criticism of Montague [29]’s vacuist treatment of conditionals.
3This relies on what Lewis [24, pp. 19–20] calls the Limit Assumption: for no world do we have worlds
that get closer and closer to it, endlessly. Nothing in the opposition between vacuism and nonvacuism
hinges on this.
4Which aspects of similarity need to count as relevant in order to deliver the intuitively good results is a
complicated business: see e.g. chapters 12 and 13 of Bennett [4].
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It also delivers vacuism. If A is impossible, there are no A-worlds. Thus, for any
B, B is, vacuously, true at all the closest A-worlds; the counterpossible is
true.
2.2 Why Nonvacuism?
The issues we are to discuss arise when we consider conditionals like the following
pair, essentially due to Nolan [30]:
(1) If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, all sick children in the mountains of
South America at the time would have cared.
(2) If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, all sick children in the mountains of
South America at the time would not have cared.
Squaring the circle is impossible. The set of possible worlds in which Hobbes
(secretly) squares the circle is empty. As a result, on the orthodox account, both (1)
and (2) are true.
This is a surprising result. It is intuitive, we take it, that (1) is false; it’s wrong to
think that the children would have cared if Hobbes, per impossibile, had (secretly)
squared the circle. Indeed, they wouldn’t even have known. But if (1) is false, then
vacuism too is false. This has motivated the construction of nonvacuist semantic
theories, which can deliver the intuitive verdict about (1).5
2.3 How Nonvacuism?
One usual approach to nonvacuism (see for example [8, 10, 28, 30] amongst others)
is to retain the contours of the orthodox account, while dropping the restriction to
possible worlds. On such an approach, (1) can be false in the way any false coun-
terfactual is: by having its consequent false at some of the closest worlds where its
antecedent is true. Because it is impossible to square the circle, none of these worlds
can be a possible world. So these approaches accept impossible worlds as well. In
other respects, however, they match the orthodoxy.6
Here, we provide a simple nonvacuist semantic theory along these lines.7 We
start with a propositional language with connectives (the counter-
factual conditional), and modal operators  and ♦. Let  be the set of proposi-
tional parameters, and let  be the set of formulas. An interpretation is a tuple
〈W,P, {RA : A ∈ }, ν〉, where:
• W the set of worlds,
5Some vacuists, e.g., [24, p. 25], have denied that there are any such intuitions of falsity. But all the
arguments we consider here are compatible with the existence of these intuitions. (Of course, vacuists
must hold that these intuitions are mistaken, but this is different from denying their existence.)
6Counterfactual conditionals are hardly the only place where impossible worlds come in handy. Impossible
worlds are also helpful in dealing with puzzles concerning content [14, 15] and intentionality [36, 39]
generally. Just as with possible worlds, there are a range of views as to the nature and metaphysical status
of impossible worlds. We do not enter into this debate here, but see [3, 6, 8, 15, 52].
7The following draws on Priest [35, Ch. 5].
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• P ⊆ W is the set of possible worlds, so I = W \ P is the set of impossible
worlds,
• for every formula, A ∈ , RA ⊆ W × W is a binary relation on W ,
• ν is a function which assigns the value 1 or 0 to every propositional parameter
p ∈  at every world; and to every formula A ∈  at every impossible world.
Write these as νw(p) = 1 (or 0) and νw(A) = 1 (or 0).
One may think of wRAw′ as meaning that w′ is ceteris paribus the same as w,
except that A holds there. If one likes talk of similarity, one can cash this out in terms
of w′ being a most similar world to w where A is true; and this will motivate certain
constraints on RA. But similarity-talk is by no means unproblematic, and no means
mandatory either.
Let us write w  A to mean that A is true at w. The truth conditions of formulas
at worlds w ∈ I are simple:
• w  A iff νw(A) = 1
Formulas are evaluated directly at impossible worlds. The truth conditions for worlds
w ∈ P are the familiar ones:
• w  p iff νw(p) = 1
• w  ¬A iff it is not the case that w  A
• w  A ∧ B iff w  A and w  B
• w  A ∨ B iff w  A or w  B
• w  A iff for all w′ ∈ P , w′  A
• w  ♦A iff for some w′ ∈ P , w′  A
• iff for all w′ such that wRAw′, w  B
An inference is valid iff it is truth preserving at all possible worlds of all
interpretations:
•  |= A iff for every interpretation, and for every w ∈ P : if w  B for all B ∈ ,
then w  A
It is not difficult to see that at possible worlds the extensional connectives work
classically, and the modal logic is standard S5.8
The only way in which these semantics differ from a standard semantics for coun-
terfactuals is in the presence of impossible worlds; and these have an effect, note,
only on counterfactuals. The impossible worlds are anarchic in the following sense:
if  is any set of formulas, and A /∈ , then there may be worlds in which B holds
for all B ∈ , but A does not. (Priest [36, Ch. 9] calls this the Secondary Directive
of impossible worlds.)
We have described a basic system of conditional logic, where there are no con-
straints on the accessibility relations. (This is a conditional logic analogue of the basic
8The logic also obeys standard structural rules; we will take these entirely for granted in what follows.
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modal logic, K.) Stronger systems can be obtained, as usual, by adding constraints
on the RAs. The intended understanding of the accessibility relation motivates the
following constraints:
• If wRAw′ then w′  A
• If w  A then wRAw
The former says that RA-accessible worlds will be A-worlds—worlds making A true.
The latter expresses the thought that if A is true at w, then w is one of the worlds
that is ceteris paribus the same as w except that A holds. It corresponds to Lewis
[24]’s “weak centering”. The conditions have an effect only when w is a possible
world, since the RAs are not involved in determining the truth value of anything at an
impossible world. As is not difficult to check, they guarantee, respectively, that
satisfies counterfactual self-implication and modus ponens:
•
•
These inferences seem obviously desirable for the counterfactual conditional.
A systematic discussion of what further constraints might be placed on the acces-
sibility relations would be out of place here. However, one constraint will play an
important role in what follows:
• If x  A for some x ∈ P , and wRAw′, then w′ ∈ P
If A is true at some possible world, and wRAw′, then w′ is possible. (We may,
in fact, restrict the condition to just possible ws, since, as noted, accessibility plays
no role at impossible worlds.) To evaluate the truth at a possible world of a condi-
tional with a possible antecedent, we do not look at impossible worlds. Thinking of
the accessibility as expressing closeness between worlds, this amounts to the claim
that for any possible world, w, any possible world is closer to w than any impossible
world. One may therefore call this the ‘Strangeness of Impossibility Condition’, or
SIC. Thinking of the accessibility relation in these terms makes the condition some-
what contentious.9 However, thinking of the relation as expressing a ceteris paribus
condition can make the condition seem natural. If A is possibly true, then if w is a
possible world, we should expect a world that is ceteris paribus the same as w except
that A is true, to be itself possible. At any rate, as is easily checked, the constraint
validates the inference:
•
which is a notational variant of the principle called POSSIBILITY in Williamson
[48, p. 156]. SIC has further important consequences for validity, as we shall see.
It is a non-trivial matter to extend the semantics to a first-order language in such
a way as to get the quantifiers to work properly. We need not go into details here,
9It is rejected in Nolan [30], where it receives this name, and in Bernstein [5] and Vander Laan [46]; but it
is accepted in Jago [15] and Mares [27].
698 F. Berto et al.
since they are not germane to what follows.10 However, identity will be relevant in
the discussion to come, so something must be said about this. Suppose, then, that
our language is augmented by the identity predicate, =, and a set of constants, in
such a way that if a and b are any constants, a = b is an atomic formula. We may
now handle the semantics of identity with constraints on interpretations. For possible
worlds w, w′, the constraints are the obvious ones:
• νw(a = a) = 1
• if νw(a = b) = 1 then νw(A) = νw(Ab(a))
where A is any atomic sentence (note the restriction to atomic sentences here: it will
matter) and Ab(a) is A with any number of occurrences of b replaced by a. Truth
values of identity statements are also invariant across possible worlds, so:
• νw(a = b) = νw′(a = b)
It is now easy to establish that if A is any sentence in which a does not occur within
the scope of a , and w is any possible world, then if w  a = b: w  A iff
w  Ab(a). So the substitutivity of identicals (SI) holds in such contexts.
There are no constraints on atomic sentences at impossible worlds. It follows, in
line with the Secondary Directive, that there may be such worlds, w, where it is not
the case that w  a = a; and where w  a = b and w  Pa, but it is not the case
that w  Pb.11 It also follows, again in line with the Secondary Directive, that even
if w  a = b and w is a possible world, one may have an impossible world, w′,
where w′  Pa, but it is not the case that w′  Pb.12
It follows from the latter fact that SI is not valid when substitution is within the
scope of counterfactuals. We will come back to this; note for now that such invalidity
is to be expected when impossible antecedents are around. For example (see Priest
[35, §19.5.4]):
• If the Morning Star were not the Evening Star, then modern astronomy would be
badly mistaken.
But the Morning Star is the Evening Star, and it is not the case that:
• If the Morning Star were not the Morning Star, then modern astronomy would
be badly mistaken.
Rather, it would be modern logic that is badly mistaken.
This framework gives a simple nonvacuist semantics. Consider an interpretation
with just two worlds, @, which is possible, and w, which is not. Let A be any logical
10The semantics for quantified conditional logics can be found in Priest [35, Ch. 19]. However, these have
only possible worlds. The semantics with impossible worlds needs to employ the matrix semantics of Ch.
18, as deployed in Ch. 23. See also Priest [36, Ch. 1].
11In the full semantics, this is achieved by letting the extension of the matrix v0 = v1 be arbitrary. See
Priest [35, §23.6].
12That is, this semantics violates the condition called ‘weak matching’ in [12]. See Ripley [38] for further
discussion of this condition. Again, in the full semantics, the matrix technique is needed. See (Priest
[35, Ch. 17]; Priest [36, Ch. 2]).
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falsehood, let @ access w and only w under RA, νw(A) = 1 and νw(B) = 0. Then
is false at @.
With this in hand, let us move on to Williamson’s criticisms.
3 Objections to Nonvacuism
We divide Williamson’s objections into two camps. In the present section, we con-
sider objections directed at nonvacuist semantic theories like the one offered above.
In Section 4, we consider objections to the intuitions that motivate nonvacuism in the
first place.
3.1 Weak Logic
Williamson [48, p. 174] offers the following objection: “We may also wonder what
logic of counterfactuals [nonvacuists] envisage. If they reject elementary principles
of the pure logic of counterfactual conditionals, that is an unattractive feature of their
position”.
Williamson does not say which logic he has in mind as “the pure logic of
counterfactual conditionals”, or which of its principles are “elementary”. However,
Williamson [49, p. 85] makes use of a counterfactual logic; we assume that the dis-
tinctively counterfactual axioms and rules of this system might give some idea. We
consider two:13
REFLEXIVITY:
CLOSURE: If 	 (B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn) ⊃ C then
The principle REFLEXIVITY holds in the logic of Section 2.3. The principle
CLOSURE does not. But should one expect this in a nonvacuist semantics? A par-
ticular case of this is: If 	 B ⊃ C then . But classically,
	 (p∧¬p) ⊃ (q∧¬q). So, . Now take p∧¬p
for A. Then using REFLEXIVITY and detaching, we get .
That is, such a logic requires that any contradiction counterfactually implies any
other. Nonvacuists, of course, think it is an attractive aspect of their view that it
allows us to reject such a conclusion. It’s wrong to think that if 2 were both equal and
not equal to 3 then it would be raining and not raining. But to maintain this, one of
REFLEXIVITY, CLOSURE, or classical logic must give. In the logic of Section 2.3,
it is CLOSURE.
CLOSURE, then, may be a basic rule of the logic Williamson has in mind for
counterfactuals, but it should not be accepted. Counterfactual suppositions can take
us beyond logical bounds; they can lead us to entertain situations in which logically
13We need not discuss the principle Williamson calls VACUITY, which is motivated directly by appeal to
vacuism; and the considerations concerning the principle Williamson calls EQUIVALENCE are much the
same as those concerning CLOSURE.
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equivalent claims come apart, or in which a claim can hold without all its conse-
quences holding. For vacuists, these are not ‘unattractive features’ of their view: they
provide one of the main intuitive motivations for it.14 (Of course, such intuitions can
be challenged; that is the topic of Section 4.)
While CLOSURE should be rejected by nonvacuists, there is a closely related
principle that they may accept. This is:
P-CLOSURE: If 	 (B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn) ⊃ C then
P-CLOSURE is just like CLOSURE except that the validity it yields has as a premise
that a certain claim is possible. Because the logic of Section 2.3 does not validate
♦(p∧¬p), the argument above against CLOSURE does not extend to P-CLOSURE .
P-CLOSURE holds of the logic we have specified, if we assume SIC. And quite
generally, with SIC in place, as long as the antecedents of all the conditionals we
are dealing with are possible, we can simply ignore the impossible worlds. So the
valid inferences of merely-possible-world semantics are recoverable enthymemati-
cally by adding suppressed premises of the form ♦A. Adding impossible worlds loses
us nothing.
The logic of counterfactuals we give is perhaps weaker than Williamson would
like. But this is not an ‘unattractive feature’; rather, it’s what’s required to capture the
intuitions the nonvacuist begins from.15
3.2 Substitution of Identicals
Consider the following pair (numbers as in Williamson [48], pp. 174–6):
(32) If Hesperus had not been Phosphorus, Phosphorus would not have been
Phosphorus.
(33) If Hesperus had not been Phosphorus, Hesperus would not have been Phos-
phorus.
We take the appropriate evaluation of these to be as follows: (32) is false, (33)
is true. (33) is an instance of REFLEXIVITY, which we endorse. (32), on the other
hand, is implausible; although Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical, if they had not
been nothing follows about the self-distinctness of one of them. In particular, there is
14Williamson [50] opens with three quick arguments for vacuism. Although we do not discuss them here,
they fit in the present section; they assume principles that, like CLOSURE , are obviously incompatible
with the intuitions that motivate nonvacuism in the first place.
15For more discussion of principles like CLOSURE and their relation to nonvacuism, see Pollock [33],
Wierenga [47] and Zagzebski [53]. One might also consider different variants of these principles, such as
the following:
• If B1, . . . , Bn 	 C, then
Here, 	 might be a consequence relation different from the target 	. These principles would be satisfied
on the kind of approach we have presented if the impossible worlds themselves are forced to obey the
logic 	. For more about this kind of approach, see (Bjerring [8]; Priest [36, §1.7]).
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no reason to expect Phosphorus to be self-distinct in such a scenario. The semantics
we have presented gets this right: a = b does not entail . Substitu-
tivity of identicals can fail on this semantics when (and only when) the substitution
in question is within the scope of a counterfactual.
That is, we take it that counterfactuals create hyperintensional contexts, contexts in
which substitutivity of identicals is not valid. This is not required by nonvacuism per
se; but it is supported by the very same kinds of intuitions that support nonvacuism.
Williamson [48, p. 175], however, holds that this is “highly implausible”. The
reason given there has two premises: that hyperintensionality occurs only in con-
structions that are “about representational features” (that is, constructions that are
broadly epistemic or intentional, like ‘It is a priori. . .’ or ‘Alice believes. . .’); and
that counterfactuals are not about representational features in this way.
We grant arguendo that counterfactuals are not broadly epistemic or intentional,16
to focus on Williamson’s other premise. An operator or a context’s being hyper-
intensional simply does not imply its being representational or broadly epistemic.
There are hyperintensional contexts that are not in any way ‘about representational
features’ (see Nolan [31]), and counterfactuals may well be among these. Hyper-
intensionality without appeal to representation is invoked in many discussions of
metaphysical grounding; see for example papers in Correia and Schnieder [11], like
Fine [13] and Koslicki [19]. On connections between grounding and counterfactu-
als, see Krakauer [40] and Schaffer [20]. Wilson [51] argues that nonvacuism follows
from a counterfactual approach to grounding. The claim that hyperintensionality as
such requires being about representational features would need serious support; and
this Williamson does not offer.
To see how counterfactuals might be hyperintensional without being about repre-
sentations, simply return to the semantics of Section 2.3. We can assume, together
with (Kripke [22]; Marcus [26]; Williamson [48, p. 161]), that if a = b, then it is
necessary for a to be b. Notice that our semantics above conforms to this: the truth
values of identity statements ‘a = b’ do not change across possible worlds. Then a’s
not being b is a way things just cannot be: an impossibility. In particular, it can be so
at an impossible world. There is nothing particularly epistemic about this, any more
than there is about a world which hosts a physical impossibility, such as (supposing
Einstein was right) something accelerating through the speed of light. A world is par-
tially characterised by a set of sentences. These tell you exactly what the world is
like—whether it is possible or impossible. And if it be retorted that if a = b, and this
statement really is about a and b, the failure of substitutivity would be impossible,
the reply is ‘Of course’!
So Williamson’s argument about ‘representational features’ fails. But one might
still think that counterfactuals allow for substitution of identicals. Williamson [48, p.
174] tries to bolster this impression with the following argument (numbered as there):
16But: Lycan [25] takes conditionals to be epistemically flavoured, for reasons that have nothing to do with
nonvacuism. Relatedly, Thomasson [43] takes metaphysical modality itself to be partly representational.
And Brogaard and Salerno [10, p. 654] appeals directly to an alleged epistemic aspect of counterfactuals to
explain failures of substitutivity like the one considered here. These are issues for Williamson, not for us.
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(34) If the rocket had continued on its course, it would have hit Hesperus.
(35) Hesperus = Phosphorus
(36) If the rocket had continued on its course, it would have hit Phosphorus.
The argument from (34) and (35) to (36) is, Williamson claims, “unproblematically
valid”.
But the argument is not valid: it turns on a step of substitution within a coun-
terfactual conditional, which we have seen is not in general truth-preserving. (This
particular argument is truth-preserving, but a truth-preserving instance of an argu-
ment form lends no support to the claim that the form itself is valid.) However, we
have allowed for substitution at possible worlds. So in the present example, the sub-
stititution could not go wrong if there were some guarantee that we remained within
the possible. Given SIC, this allows us to see this argument as enythmematic, with
missing premise ♦(The rocket continued on its course).
3.3 Reductio Arguments
Another Williamsonian objection to nonvacuism, found in both Williamson
[48, 50], comes from reductio arguments.17 Reductio arguments are, of course,
crucial to mathematics as it is practiced. Williamson attempts to show that nonva-
cuists about counterpossibles must hold current standard mathematical practice to be
mistaken.
Although Williamson admits that mathematical practice does not depend on using
counterfactuals in the formulation of reductio arguments, he calls it “surely legiti-
mate” to do so. And indeed, there is some temptation to assert counterfactuals when
reporting a particular line of reasoning by reductio, and also when explaining what it
is that makes reductio reasoning valid in the first place: ‘It can’t be that A, because
if it were that A, then it would be that B; but B is wrong, so A too must be’. This
kind of reasoning is perfectly valid in the semantics we have presented; we have
. This comes from the classicality of the base world plus weak cen-
tering; nothing more is required. The presence of impossible worlds provides only
extra ways for to fail, and so does nothing to affect this argument: it is valid
for the vacuist and nonvacuist alike.
The trouble stems from certain counterpossibles that are or can be used in reductio
reasoning in this way. Since the reasoning is good, the counterpossibles ought to
come out true. However, Williamson claims that nonvacuists cannot make good on
this prediction, and end up calling the counterpossibles false.
Williamson [50] considers the following examples:18
17Williamson [48, p. 174] claims that “some objectors” (that is, nonvacuists) have pointed to reductio
arguments in support of nonvacuism, but the only reference in the surroundings is to Nolan [30], which
is explicit in rejecting any such support. Similarly, the primary target of Williamson [50] is Brogaard and
Salerno [10], which does not discuss reductio arguments. The other nonvacuists cited there are Nolan [30]
(again) and Kment [18], which also does not discuss reductio arguments. For what it’s worth, our own
past endorsements of nonvacuism also do not claim such support. We do not know who Williamson has in
mind.
18(56) and (57) come from Lewis [24, p. 25].
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(56) If there were a largest prime p, p! + 1 would be prime.
(57) If there were a largest prime p, p! + 1 would be composite.
(58) If there were a largest prime p, p! + 1 would be both prime and composite.
Williamson considers the following proof that there is no largest prime: first, show
(56) and (57) on their own merits. Then, conclude (58) from them. Finally, appeal
to our knowledge that no number is both prime and composite to conclude that there
is no largest prime.19 Again, the final step of this reasoning is unproblematic for
vacuists and nonvacuists alike; the alleged trouble for the nonvacuist is in getting
(56)–(58) to come out true.
Why is (56) meant to be true? Because p! + 1 is not divisible by n for any n ≤ p,
and if p is the largest prime all primes must be ≤ p. So p! + 1 has no prime factors
at all, and so none other than itself; it must therefore be prime. Why is (57) meant to
be true? Because p! + 1 is greater than p, and if p is the greatest prime everything
greater must be composite. And why is (58) meant to be true? Because (56) and (57)
are, and they have the same antecedent, so we can conjoin their consequents.
But by what right, Williamson objects, can the nonvacuist endorse these claims?
If there really were a largest prime p, after all, the natural numbers would be very
different from how they in fact are. So why should one expect the given reasoning to
work even in such an impossible situation?
One way to answer this objection is simply to claim that counterfactuals are not
really being used in the proof at all. A counterfactual of the form is just a
fac¸on de parler for the thought that B follows from the assumption that A. The role
of counterfactual talk is then merely to signal A’s role as an assumption (to be later
discharged) in the reasoning to follow.20
However, a different reply is illuminating for other reasons. Let us consider the
role of context in counterfactuals.21 Any broadly Kratzer-, Lewis-, or Stalnaker-like
approach to counterfactuals involves two key ingredients: an underlying space of
worlds or situations, and some apparatus for focusing on the ones relevant to inter-
preting the counterfactual at hand. All existing approaches to counterfactuals, vacuist
and nonvacuist alike, take the second ingredient to be sensitive to the context in which
a counterfactual occurs: there is simply no other way to get sensible results. As Lewis
[24, p. 92] puts the point, “The truth conditions for counterfactuals. . . are a highly
volatile matter, varying with every shift of context and interest”.22
This contextual variation is effected in different ways in different formalisms. In
the semantics of Section 2.3, it is linked to the RA relations; different contexts will
19This is not the usual proof that there is no largest prime. (This shows that for any prime, p, there must
be a larger. Either p! + 1 is prime or, if not, there must be a prime between p and p! + 1.) But it is a fine
one for our purposes.
20Or perhaps, as an anonymous referee suggests, we could simply reject counterfactual talk entirely, and
insist on indicative versions of (56)–(58).
21For more detailed consideration of the roles context can play in the interpretation of counterpossibles,
see Vander Laan [46].
22Of course this is not to say (and Lewis certainly does not think, as he goes on to make clear) that anything
goes; although some of us may believe this, nothing so extreme is needed for the present response. We
mean to point to a particularly modest instance of context sensitivity.
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determine different RAs. When we consider what would be the case if A were the
case, the collection of worlds accessed is determined not by A alone, but by the
interaction of A and the context of assertion. Context determines which aspects of
reality we attempt to hold fixed as we modify things to make room for the truth of
the antecedent.23
In contexts where (56)–(58) are uttered in the course of the imagined reductio
argument, they are true. Conversational participants hold fixed what they know about
the additive and multiplicative structure of the natural numbers; with such facts fixed,
the claims follow easily, for the reasons sketched above. In the context of a mathe-
matical proof in standard arithmetic, facts about addition, division, etc. are exactly
the kind of things held fixed. What else would one expect?
This does not mean, however, that such mathematical facts must be held fixed
in every conversational context. Thus, for example, in a discussion of mathematical
finitism,24 it could be quite correct to say that if there were a greatest number, there
would be a greatest prime number. In such a context, we would not hold fixed that
every number has a successor. Or we might discuss what the physical world would
be like if there were a largest prime number. Again, we cannot allow all of the facts
of standard arithmetic to carry over.25
We conclude that nonvacuist approaches such as the one presented above do not
impose a problematically weak logic; that there is no trouble in failing to allow for
substitution of identicals within counterfactuals; and that nonvacuists can make good
sense of counterfactuals that seem to play a role in mathematical reasoning.
4 Questioning Nonvacuist Intuitions
A main motivation for nonvacuism remains intuitive.26 Williamson has taken up
another line of attack against nonvacuism, centering on such intuitive support. He
grants that the relevant intuitions are present, but argues that they are not veridical.
We consider three Williamsonian arguments in this ballpark.
4.1 Thinking it Through
The first concerns an example due to Nolan [30]. (See also the discussion in Brogaard
and Salerno [9]). Suppose that I am asked ‘What is 5+7?’, and answer ‘11’. Consider
23For a familiar example, consider this pair of counterfactuals, discussed in Lewis [24, pp. 66f.]:
• If Caesar had been in command [in Korea] he would have used the atom bomb.
• If Caesar had been in command [in Korea] he would have used catapults.
There are contexts in which the first seems true and the second false, and contexts in which just the
opposite is the case. The first kind of context is one in which we hold fixed the technology available in the
Korean War, and Caesar’s overall style of approach. The second kind of context is one in which we hold
fixed the kind of army Caesar had at his disposal.
24As in van Bendegem [45].
25For examples of contexts like the latter, see Baron et al. [2].
26We note that there are others. See Jenny [30] and Nolan [17].
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the following sentences (numbering from Williamson [48, p. 172]’s discussion of this
case):
(30) If 5 + 7 were 13 I would have got that sum right.
(31) If 5 + 7 were 13 I would have got that sum wrong.
At first blush, (30) seems false and (31) true. Of course, if (30) is actually false then
so is vacuism, so long as it is necessary that 5 + 7 isn’t 13. Williamson responds to
this case:
[Such examples] tend to fall apart when thought through. For example, if 5 + 7
were 13 then 5 + 6 would be 12, and so (by another eleven steps) 0 would be 1,
so if the number of right answers I gave were 0, the number of right answers I
gave would be 1. We prefer (31) to (30) because the argument for (31) is more
obvious, but the argument for (30) is equally strong. (p. 172)
It seems to us, though, that the argument for (30) is not equally strong. To see this
it suffices, again, to note the role of context.27 As we pointed out in Section 3.3,
whether a particular chain of reasoning succeeds or fails in supporting the truth of a
counterfactual depends on the context, and in particular what truths about the case
need to be held fixed to legitimate the reasoning.
In this case, all we need to hold fixed for (31) to be true is that the questioner
asked what 5 + 7 is, that the answer given was 11, and that 11 is not 13. Williamson’s
argument for (30) needs to hold fixed all of those same facts, plus facts about decre-
menting left and right addends (in particular, that 5 + 7 = 13 	 5 + 6 = 12—and
its subtraction-generated cousins—are true),28 plus facts connecting ‘number of right
answers’ given to whether someone gets an answer right.29
The contexts in which (30) comes out true, then, are a superset of those in which
(31) comes out true. So long as there are contexts in which we can let facts about
decrementing and incrementing vary, for example, it is a proper superset. But to sup-
pose that 5 + 7 is 13 is to suppose that the additive structure of the numbers is
something other than it actually is. Without some special context (like, say, being
in the course of a certain kind of mathematical proof—again, compare Section 3.3),
we have reason to expect that we should not hold fixed facts about incrementing and
decrementing under such a supposition. So without some special context, we should
expect that (31) is true and (30) not. In other words, for Williamson’s argument to
work, he needs to argue that we are in such a context, which he does not attempt.
Williamson is not sensitive to this point, we suspect, because he is refusing to
allow any necessary facts to vary at all under counterfactual supposition, regardless
27We remark that at the final stage of the argument for (30), Williamson substitutes 1 for 0, which, as
explained, we take to be invalid.
28There are inconsistent arithmetics where one can have n + 1 = m + 1 without having n = m (even
though n + 1 = m + 1 ⊃ n = m. ⊃ does not detach; see Priest [34, Ch. 17].)
29That the argument needs to hold fixed that 11 is not 13 is perhaps not obvious, so we pause here to
explain. Note that the argument needs to conclude that the number of right answers given was 0 to proceed
to the claim that it is 1. The only way we see to reach the conclusion that the number of right answers
given was 0 is to appeal to 11’s distinctness from 13.
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of context. It is as though he treats every context as if it were one of mathematical
proof. But this refusal is dialectically inappropriate; it amounts to assuming what is
at issue. Insisting on holding all necessary truths fixed will undermine one’s ability to
reach intuitive verdicts about counterpossibles—and this has been clear from the get-
go. Thinking things through, then, undermines Williamson’s argument, not Nolan’s
example.
4.2 A Heuristic?
Williamson’s main attempt to undermine nonvacuist intuitions works by proposing a
particular hypothesis about how these are reached. Recall (1):
(1) If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, all sick children in the mountains of
South America at the time would have cared.
No matter how we come at this sentence, we find it stubbornly seeming to be false.
Here is Williamson [50]’s explanation for this seeming. We naturally take coun-
terfactuals of the form and to be contraries: ‘If you were to win
the lottery you would be happy’ and ‘If you were to win the lottery you would not be
happy’ cannot both be true.30 According to Williamson, this natural tendency is the
result of a fallible heuristic, (HCC*).31
• (HCC*) If you accept one of and , reject the other.
According to Williamson, then, we take a counterpossible to be false
because we have computed the truth value of , found it to be true, and
applied (HCC*) in order to conclude that is false.
On its face, this theory is worryingly ad hoc: the only evidence we have for the
presence of a heuristic like (HCC*) is the very intuitions, inconvenient for vacuism,
it is invoked to explain away. But it has two additional problems. First, there seem
to be a range of cases in which intuitive judgments do not accord with what (HCC*)
would predict. Second, the picture Williamson offers of how (HCC*) enters into our
intuitive judgments seems implausible.
If it is (HCC*), rather than semantic competence, that explains speakers’ judg-
ments that some counterpossibles are false, two things follow. Faced with counter-
possibles and , speakers should not judge both to be true, and
speakers should not judge both to be false. They should not judge both to be true
because (HCC*) militates against it: having judged one of the two to be true, a
speaker making use of (HCC*) should thereby judge the other to be false. And they
should not judge both to be false because these judgments would be inexplicable: to
get a verdict of falsity for one of these conditionals from (HCC*), the other one must
have been judged true.
30Indeed, Williamson suggests that we may confuse with , thus taking them
to be contradictories. But whether or not this is so, contrariety is all his explanation requires.
31Williamson discusses two potential heuristics, (HCC) and (HCC*). We work with (HCC*) because it is
the one Williamson prefers; but the two provide, essentially, the same explanation for the key intuitions,
and they are subject to the same objections.
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But there are cases in which counterpossibles and both seem
true, and cases in which both seem false. For example, both of
• If it were raining and not raining, it would be raining
• If it were raining and not raining, it would not be raining
appear to be true. And both of
• If it were raining and not raining, it would be Tuesday
• If it were raining and not raining, it would not be Tuesday
appear to be false. Williamson’s theory cannot explain these intuitions. Williamson
might simply deny them. But if not, the former pair shows that (HCC*) is not used
generally, even where it could easily apply; and the latter pair shows that at least
some cases of counterpossibles being judged false cannot be explained by (HCC*).
To show the implausibility of Williamson’s account of the application of (HCC*),
we begin from his own general picture of counterfactual judgments, Williamson
[48, p. 147ff], which we find, on the contrary, quite plausible. On this picture, to eval-
uate a counterfactual , we imagine situations in which the antecedent holds,
and check these imaginations to see whether the consequent holds robustly in such
situations. But there is no place in this process for (HCC*) to act. So Williamson
wants us to imagine that in the case of certain counterfactuals like (1), we don’t use
this process. Rather, in such cases, Williamson has it, we shift our attention to the
distinct sentence (2), and then evaluate (2) according to the usual procedure. Having
judged (correctly) that (2) is true via this procedure, Williamson supposes that we
then apply (HCC*) to reach the verdict that (1) is false. By supposing that speakers
judging (1) first judge (2) in the ordinary way, Williamson opens up room for (HCC*)
to apply.
We see no reason to resort to this more complex procedure. The general method
will do; we may evaluate the truth of (1) directly in the usual ways. We just consider
situations in which Hobbes squared the circle; and we see that the consequent does
not generally hold in these. Hence we take the conditional to be false. (As an analogy,
if one is trying to test whether B follows from A in some natural deduction system or
sequent calculus, one does not first have to test whether ¬B does.) Finally, we note,
the claim that we evaluate (2) before (1) seems entirely ad hoc. We could just as well
have started by evaluating (1), so reversing the picture.
Williamson’s proposed heuristic, then, makes mistaken predictions about speaker
judgments of counterpossibles. It requires counterpossibles like (1) to be judged in a
different way from counterfactuals generally (and from counterpossibles like (2)) – a
way that is both more complex and unmotivated.
4.3 Vacuous Quantification
Williamson [48, p. 173] also makes an attempt to undermine trust in nonvacuist intu-
itions based on an analogy with vacuous (universal) quantification. “The logically
unsophisticated”, he has it, find it intuitive that, given that ‘Every golden mountain
is a mountain’ is true, then ‘Every golden mountain is a valley’ should be false, for
being a mountain and being a valley are incompatible. However, both claims are
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true, vacuously, if there are no golden mountains. People extrapolate wrongly from
familiar cases, in which one does not quantify vacuously.
The point is expanded in Williamson [50, §6]. A natural inclination, we are told,
is to judge:
• Every dolphin in Oxford has arms and legs
• Every unicorn is hornless
as false, even though there no unicorns or dolphins in Oxford. Despite this inclination,
these claims are true, because there are no unicorns or dolphins in Oxford.
The intended analogy with vacuous quantification is clear: if there are no circum-
stances in which the antecedent of a counterfactual is true, then counterfactuals with
that antecedent are true. This is because for a counterfactual to be untrue there must
be circumstances at which its antecedent is true. But the analogy looks question-
begging: what is at issue is whether there are such circumstances, not what would
happen in their absence.
We note, also, that Williamson has an objectionable view of the history of
universal quantification. He says (§6):
Our theoretical grasp of universal quantification is currently more secure than
it is of counterfactual conditionals [...]. But it was not always so. Centuries of
confusion about the existential import or otherwise of the universal quantifier
bear witness to the difficulty of achieving a clear view or the truth conditions of
sentences of our native language formed using the most basic logical constants.
But the consensus of the great medieval logicians, including Scotus, Ockham, and
Buridan, was that all of these sentences are false, since ‘Every P is Q’ entails ‘Some
P is Q’. These thinkers had perfectly precise theories of restricted quantification,
consistent with both Aristotelian syllogistic and the Aristotelian square of opposi-
tion (see Read [37]). In disagreement with contemporary logic they may have been;
confused they were not.32
Finally, we note that Williamson means to extend his heuristics to these vacuous
quantifications. He proposes (§6) that we judge universal quantifications according
to the heuristic he calls (HUQ*): “If you accept one of ‘Every σ φs’ and ‘Every σ
¬φs, reject the other”. This, he takes it, explains the intuition that some such vacuous
quantifications are false. But this has the same problems as his (HCC*) hypothesis.
In particular, it cannot explain the judgments of the medieval greats; they took all
of these sentences to be false, and so could not have arrived at these judgments by
applying (HUQ*).
32Williamson [50, §6], says “In the case of the universal quantifier, a clear understanding was finally
achieved though systematic, highly general semantics and logical theorising, rather than a more data driven
approach”. This mischaracterizes the great medieval logicians, whose work was highly systematic logical
theorising.
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5 FromWilliamson’s Modal Epistemology to Nonvacuism
We end our discussion by considering the role vacuism plays in Williamson’s episte-
mology, and arguing that nonvacuism can be directly motivated on the basis of such
epistemology.
5.1 Counterfactual Paths to Necessity
Behind Williamson’s attacks on nonvacuism, we suspect, is the thought that vacuism
is required to ground our knowledge of metaphysical modality in our assessments
of counterfactual conditionals. This idea is at the core of Williamson [48]’s modal
epistemology. The strategy is to construe claims of metaphysical necessity as equiv-
alent to certain counterfactual claims, and argue on this basis that the epistemology
of metaphysical modality reduces to the epistemology of counterfactuals.33
We won’t address here the extent to which Williamson’s reduction is successful
(for some criticism, see Jenkins [16] and Peacocke [32]). We’ll just focus on the
extent to which this project is tied to vacuism. If vacuism is required for it to work,
that in itself may count somewhat in favour of vacuism. But Williamson’s approach
is compatible with a certain kind of nonvacuism.
To characterize metaphysical necessity in terms of the counterfactual conditional,
Williamson [48, 49], drawing on Lewis [24, pp. 21–24], present three candidate
logical equivalents of A:
(a)
(b)
(c)
The metaphysically necessary can be recognized as (a) that whose negation coun-
terfactually implies falsum (notice that for Williamson ‘⊥’ is a placeholder for a
contradiction Williamson [48, p. 156]); (b) what is counterfactually implied by its
own negation; (c) what would be the case, whatever were the case. In the presence of
vacuism, the first two are equivalent and, if one allows oneself an obvious set-up for
propositional quantification, the third one is, too (Williamson [48, p. 297]). However,
on a nonvacuist approach these are not equivalent, as we will see.
Given its simplicity, Williamson [48, p. 157] initially characterises A in terms
of (a) above. In our setting we will enrich our language from Section 2.3 with the
constant ⊥. We will assume the following semantics for ⊥: it is true at no possible
world, and at all impossible worlds. (This is a violation of the Secondary Directive,
but it seems harmless if ⊥ simply expresses the fact that we are in an impossible
world—of course, ¬⊥ can be true there too.)
With these assumptions in play, A is indeed equivalent to : if one
of them is true at a possible world, then so is the other; this suffices to show
33See also Kroedel [23].
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and . First, suppose that A is true at a pos-
sible world w. Then for every possible world w′, A is true at w′. Hence, ¬A is false
at w′. Now consider the value of at w. We consider worlds, w′, where
wR¬Aw′. Since ¬A is true at these, they must be impossible. So ⊥ is true at all of
these; thus is true at w. Conversely, suppose that is true at a
possible world w. Then every world w′ with wR¬Aw′ is such that ⊥ is true at w′;
that is, no such w′ is possible. By SIC, then, it must be that ¬A is true at no possible
world. This is to say that A is true at every possible world, and so A is as well.
We note, however, that (b) and (c) are quite different. In this setting, for a given
sentence A, (c) entails (b), which in turn entails (a);34 but neither entailment is
reversible.35 Thus, (b) and (c) are too strong to serve as equivalents for A. Only (a)
will do.
Williamson’s official story from Williamson [48, pp. 141-65], concerning the cog-
nitive mechanisms involved in our evaluation of counterfactuals and how they ground
our assessment of claims of metaphysical necessity, is put largely in terms of (a). The
equivalence between (a) and A can be captured on the present nonvacuist approach,
given SIC and the assumption about ⊥. It is only the equivalence between (a)–(c)
that fails on this nonvacuist picture, not the equivalence between (a) and A.
Recall that Williamson’s aim is to ground our knowledge of metaphysically modal
truths in our knowledge of certain counterfactuals. One might worry that this project
is put in jeopardy by the switch from Williamson’s ⊥, which is p ∧ ¬p, for some
p, to the approach we have given to ⊥, on which it holds in all and only impossible
worlds. This latter ⊥ is clearly modal. So, on the nonvacuist replacement account we
are offering, our modal knowledge would seem to presuppose a certain amount of
modal knowledge.
Williamson’s original approach, however, is in the same boat. Although his char-
acterization of ⊥ is not immediately modal, for it to work to yield knowledge that A
is metaphysically necessary it is not good enough that ⊥ is not true, or even that it
is known not to be true. For A to be known modulo the recognition of the equiv-
alence with , we need to know that ⊥ cannot be true. Substantial modal
knowledge is still being presupposed. Our suggested approach makes this presup-
posed knowledge easy to come by—indeed, trivial: ⊥ is characterized in such a way
that it is impossible for it to be true. Williamson’s modal epistemology, then, does
not require vacuism.
34That (c) entails (b) is straightforward: if everything counterfactually implies A, then ¬A does. That (b)
entails (a) is also fairly easy to see. First, notice that if is true at a possible world w, it must
be that A is true at each w′ such that wR¬Aw′. But then each such w′ must be impossible (since ¬A is
true at all of them as well), and so ⊥ is true at each of them.
35Consider a model 〈W,P, {RA : A ∈ }, ν〉 with:
• W = {w1, w2, i1, i2}• P = {w1, w2}• w1R¬pi1, w2R¬pi2, w2Rqi1• p is true at w1, w2, and i2; ¬p is true at i1 and i2; q is true at i1 only.
In this model, is true at w1 (and w2); but is not true at w1, showing that (a) does
not entail (b). But is true at w2, and is not, showing that (b) does not entail (c).
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5.2 Supposing the Impossible
Indeed, Williamson’s modal epistemology may itself provide reasons to believe in
impossible worlds, and so open a door to nonvacuism. This is so because of a
key claim in the Williamsonian account of Williamson [48, Chapter 5]: that we
can suppose and, perhaps, imagine absolute impossibilities.36 Williamson claims
that knowledge of necessity can be had by coming to know certain counterfactuals.
Knowledge of these, in turn, is obtained as follows:
One supposes the antecedent and develops the supposition, adding further judg-
ments within the supposition by reasoning, offline predictive mechanisms, and
other offline judgments. [...] To a first approximation: one asserts the counter-
factual conditional if and only if the development eventually leads one to add
the consequent. (Williamson [48, p. 152–153])
In particular:
We assert A when our counterfactual development of the supposition that ¬A
robustly yields a contradiction. (Williamson [48, p. 163])
But this means that, if A is correct, we have been mentally representing an impos-
sibility. Williamson does not provide a semantics for supposing or imagining. But in
supposing, or imagining, an impossible situation, are we not considering (not in all
detail) an impossible world, or scenario? A natural semantics for ‘Cognitive agent x
	’s that A’, ‘	’ standing for the relevant intentional state, is one in which the oper-
ator is understood in terms of (restricted) quantification over worlds, mimicking the
ordinary possible worlds semantics for intentional (epistemic and doxastic) opera-
tors. (See, for example (Berto [7]; Goddard and Routley [14, §7.2.8]; Priest [36, Ch.
9].) And since we can represent impossibilities (as Willamson agrees), the worlds in
question must at least sometimes be impossible. So Williamson’s epistemic project
is not only compatible with nonvacuism, it naturally leads to impossible worlds on
its own.
6 Conclusion
Williamson’s arguments should not worry nonvacuists. His theoretical arguments do
not reveal troubles in nonvacuist semantic theories, and his attempts to undermine
nonvacuist intuitions are unconvincing. Finally, vacuism may not be required for a
Williamsonian approach to modal epistemology. Indeed, the impossible worlds often
invoked by nonvacuists may play a natural role in it.
36It is not clear to us whether Williamson makes a distinction between supposing and imagining as mental
activities. In the quotes provided below, he speaks of supposing. In his book he also speaks, however, of
imagination as essentially involved in our evaluation of counterfactuals. And we note that, for him (p.
170), “Imagine that there is a barber who shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves” is not
radically different from the instruction “Suppose that there is a barber who shaves all and only those who
do not shave themselves”. On how imagining may differ from supposing, see Balcerak Jackson [1].
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